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1Abstract
This paper represents an in-depth examination of Separation of Power issues 
raised in the context of the Legislative and Executive Branch’s exercise of their War 
Powers. Specifically, the paper considers the argument raised by the Bush Administration 
that Congress cannot constitutionally infringe on the President’s exercise of his 
Commander in Chief Power in the fight against terrorism. Such an argument would 
effectively insulate most Presidential decisions related to terrorism from Congressional 
oversight. The implication being that even if Congress wanted to accomplish something 
like ending the detainment of detainees at Guatanamo Bay it would be outside their 
Constitutional authority. The paper considers whether this argument is valid under either 
a formalist or more contextual view of Separation of Powers, and ultimately concludes 
that in any Branch conflict Congress should ultimately prevail.
Separation of Powers and the Commander in Chief: Congress’s Authority to 
Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations
By Reid Skibell1
“These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our 
constitutional history.”
- Justice Jackson on the Commander in Chief Power
I. Introduction: The Independent President
Throughout United States history Presidents have consistently argued that they 
have strong inherent war powers, and in this sense the position taken by Bush 
Administration is hardly noteworthy.2 It is true that the Bush administration is arguing 
that the Commander in Chief Power gives the President some inherent authority to act in 
1
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CONTRA AFFAIR 38 (1990) (arguing that there is a long history of President’s attempting to expand their 
war powers). 
2the domestic sphere, which has not been raised in a serious manner since World War II. 
However, this is still not a new position in terms of the Constitutional history of the 
United States. What is unique to the Bush Administration is a consistent argument that 
the inherent and extensive war powers of the President may not be infringed upon by 
Congress. While this implication might have been the logical result of past presidential 
arguments for an expansive Commander in Chief Power, never before has it been 
straightforwardly pursued as a theory. Past Presidents have realized that there was little 
danger to Congress over-riding their decisions, and they did not want to raise such a 
controversial position because it would make it difficult for courts to uphold independent 
Presidential action. For example, it is likely that the reason the Supreme Court in Dames 
& Moore v. Regan3 went to such great lengths to find tacit Congressional support for the 
Iran hostage agreement was precisely because they did not want to probe the limits of 
inherent Presidential power and raise the specter of Congressional exclusion.4 Despite the 
conceivable tactical disadvantages of asserting such a position, the Executive Branch 
contended in Padilla v. Rumsfield5 that his power to detain enemy non-combatant is 
exclusive and cannot be infringed upon by Congressional statute.6 The Majority opinion 
noted that, “if the President's Commander-in-Chief powers were plenary in the context of 
a domestic seizure of an American citizen, the government's argument that the legislature 
could not constitutionally prohibit the President from detaining citizens would have some 
3 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
4 See Allan Ides, Congressional Authority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons, in FIRST USE OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHO DECIDES? 73 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 
1987) (explaining that the Supreme Court engaged in a drawn out exercise of statutory construction to find 
Congressional support for Presidential action in Dames & Moore). 
5 352 F.3d 695 (2003). 
6 See Pildes and Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 32 (“ the government argued that Congress could not 
constitutionally legislate to deny the President this power.”).
3force.”7 A similar argument is also being raised by the Administration in other contexts. 
In the Guatanamo Bay detainee cases the President has claimed that Congress could not 
constitutionally extend the jurisdiction of Article III courts to allow habeas corpus 
petitions by detainees because such a law would be an infringement on Presidential 
authority.8 Also, internal memos unearthed by the New York Times also demonstrate that 
an argument is being raised within the Administration that the President is not bound by 
treaties or statutes prohibiting the use of torture since they cannot legitimately restrict his 
Commander in Chief Power. 9 Lastly, in a variety of areas the administration has used the 
Commander in Chief Power as a general reason to withhold information from Congress 
and to exclude it from decisions related to the war on terrorism.10
This paper will raise an argument that there is a danger to the political process in 
recognizing that the President’s authority under the Commander in Chief cannot be 
infringed upon by Congress. When there is some distance from a crisis, as there is 
currently, Congress can use informal controls to ensure that it is part of the decision-
making on terrorism decisions regardless of the division of Constitutional powers. 
7
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Paul Krugman points out that the legal arguments the Bush Administration is advancing in support of its 
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right to keep secret meetings of the Energy Task Force. Consequently, it would seem that a ratification of 
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Power, New York Times April 27, 2004, available at: 
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4Congress can assert itself by threatening to vote down legislation important to the 
President, holding hearings to politically pressure the President, or even invoking its 
impeachment power. The greater danger is that the Bush Administration may create a 
precedent which would allow a President to act independently of Congress in the 
aftermath of a crisis. Consequently, this paper will argue that Congress’ war powers are 
sufficiently robust that it can countermand Presidential decisions justified under a broad 
interpretation of the Commander in Chief Power. Part II will explain the historical danger 
represented by national crises, and the role that isolated decision-making has played in 
past mistakes. Part III will detail how much authority the Bush Administration claims to 
possess under the Commander in Chief Power. This section will also deal with the 
appropriations power and explain why it is not a sufficient check on Presidential powe r in 
this context. Part IV will explore how under Separation of Powers formalism there would 
be an argument for excluding Congress, and the problems with this approach. Part V will 
compare formalism with a functionalist approach to Separation of Powers. After 
considering arguments for why either Congress or the President could prevail under a 
functionalist balancing test, this section ultimately conclude that Congress has a stronger 
Constitutional interest. Finally, Part VI will conclude that it is imprudent and unnecessary 
for the Executive Branch to raise this argument about excluding Congress from important 
decisions related to the proclaimed “War on Terror”. 
II. The Dangers of Isolated Decision-making
The American experience of balancing liberty and national security during crises 
has been riddled with mistakes - decisions that seemed to be legitimate at the time have 
come to be regarded as regrettable errors in judgment. Each example exhibits a similar 
5pattern of policymakers restricting civil liberties as part of an overreaction to a perceived 
threat during a crisis, and later a public recognition that these restrictions were 
unnecessary after the crisis has abated. Justice William Brennan captured the episodic 
nature of this response when he wrote:
For as adamant as my country has been about civil liberties during peacetime, it
has a long history of failing to preserve civil liberties when it perceived its
national security threatened. This series of failures is particularly frustrating in
that it appears to result not from informed and rational decisions that protecting
civil liberties would expose the United States to unacceptable security
risks, but rather from the episodic nature of our security crises. After each 
perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that 
the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to 
prevent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along.11
As illustrations for this theory Brennan pointed to examples such as the Alien and 
Sedition Act of 1798, Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the 
Espionage Act of 1917, and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War 
II.12 The consistency of this failing over different historical periods and in response to 
varying types of crises is disturbing, particularly given that some scholars argue that the 
response to the terrorist attack of 9-11 evidences similarities to past overreactions.13
Furthermore, even if the government is properly striking a balance between civil liberties 
concerns and anti-terrorist measures, this episodic history leads to sharply pessimistic 
11
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12
 Brennan, supra note 9, at 4.  
13 See, e.g., Timothy Lynch, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While Fighting 
Terrorism, Cato Policy Analysis No. 443 (June 26, 2002), available at: 
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6predictions about what future reactions to domestic terrorism might look like. The nature 
of terrorism is such that it is intended to create a climate of fear and insecurity, the 
seemingly perfect ingredients for an overreaction. 
Certain institutional patterns emerge from looking back at the history of American 
reactions to security crises. One of the most evident features has been that decision-
makers in the quest for haste have acted to curtail civil liberties on the basis of less than 
compelling evidence. For example, in March 1942 World War II Congress voted to ratify 
President Roosevelt’s Executive Order that empowered the military to intern Japanese-
Americans on the basis of War Department evidence that there was a significant danger 
from insurgents with relatively little debate. 14 However, it turned out this ‘evidence’ did 
not in fact exist, and the War Department’s assessment of the danger was largely due to a 
report by the openly racist General John L. DeWitt. 15 This example is fairly typical, 
given that an examination of similar situations reveals that, “at the time the policies were 
chosen at least some of the relevant decision-makers knew, and more should have known, 
that the policies they were adopting were either responses to exaggerated threats or likely
to be ineffective in countering the real threats.”16
14 See Devins, supra note 9, at 1142.
15 See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 
273, 288 (noting that the War Department findings were based on the recommendations of General DeWitt, 
who was a racist). 
16 Id. Interestingly, a similar pattern of information failure whereby decision-makers acted on information 
known by other members of the government to be either factually wrong or inaccurate in emphasis was 
found to be evident in US intelligence efforts leading up to 9-11. See Staff of the Senate Select Comm. on 
Intelligence and the Home Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong., Findings of the Final 
Report on the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 2 (Dec. 10, 2002) (Comm. 
Print 2002), at http://intelligence.senate.gov/findings.pdf (“Although relevant information that is significant 
in retrospect regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 
2001, the Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its 
collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack.”)
7This pattern makes more sense if looked at from the perspective of the decision-
maker.17 In the early stages of a crisis there is a need to act with haste and individuals 
have to act on the basis of limited information. Under such difficult conditions mistakes 
are understandably made, and it is reasonable that policymakers would err on the side of 
restricting liberty.18 However, this does not fully account for the types of decisions that 
have traditionally been made in the face of security threats. History demonstrates that 
isolated decision makers, “are more likely to succumb to the perils of groupthink, self-
delusion, and hubris.”19 This finding is also consistent with the psychological evidence, 
which tends to demonstrate that individuals who do not have to publicly defend the bases 
for their decisions tend to use inconsistent logic and be overly motivated by emotion. 20 It 
is this tendency that accounts for the fact that General DeWitt, as a front-line decision 
maker, may have felt that he knew better than his superiors what the true risks were and 
manipulated evidence to ensure that they made what he believed to be an accurate 
assessment. 21
It is also noteworthy that mistakes in balancing civil liberties versus security have 
been generally made by the Executive Branch. While this can be explained by the fact 
that it is that arm of government which has been faced with making these types of 
difficult choices, there are also reasons to be wary of unilateral Executive determinations 
in times of war. The Framers were well aware that the Executive Branch incentives that 
17
 See Tushnet, supra note at 290-291. 
18 See Richard A. Posner, The Truth About Our Liberties, 3 Responsive Community 3, 5 (Summer 2002) 
(arguing that policy makers should evaluate security concerns more heavily in the face of terrorist threats). 
19 Jack M. Balkin, The Truth About Our Institutions, 4 Responsive Community 89, 90 (Fall 2002). 
20 See Jennifer S. Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 2 
Psychological Bulletin 255 (1999) (reviewing the psychological literature on lack of accountability).
21 See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 291; Balkin supra note 17, at 90 (“like all those who wield power on 
behalf of others, [government officials] have natural incentives to abuse their authority if there are not 
sufficient checks and monitoring devices.”)
8differ from the other branches with respect to war. James Madison noted in a famous 
passage that:
War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war a physical force 
is to be created, and it is the executive will which is to direct it. In war the public 
treasures are to be unlocked, and it is the executive hand which is to dispense 
them. In war the honors and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is 
the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, 
that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. 
The strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; 
ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in 
conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. 22
Madison was primarily concerned with the temptation of the President to engage in wars, 
but there is a similar dynamic with respect to other types of decisions in the context of 
warfare. One of the reasons that the public looks to the President in times of crisis is for 
reassurance, and such strength is best demonstrated by actions which stress security at the 
expense of liberty. 23 For example, the interment of Japanese-Americans was a symbol of 
action that in the immediate aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor might have been 
justified regardless of its usefulness. This is not to say that such a calculation necessarily 
is a direct part of Presidential decision-making, but there is almost certainly an effect 
from the fact that the President’s popularity is maximized by emphasizing security at the 
expense of liberty during war-time. The fame that Madison references also creates an 
accompanying sense of urgency to win swift decisive victories. Consequently, the 
President may feel pressured to make sacrifices of civil liberties in an effort to further the 
war effort, even in the absence of compelling evidence for such actions. 
22 James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 106, 108 (Robert Rutland et 
al. eds., Virginia University Press 1985). See also William Michael Treanor, Fame, The Founding, and the 
Power to Declare War, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 695 (1997) (detailing the framers’ appreciation of the dangers 
represented by the pursuit of glory). 
23 See Jay Winik, The Presidency in Wartime, 3 Responsive Community 72 (Summer 2002) (explaining 
that the public expects decisive action from the president in times of crisis). 
9These errors on judgments would not be so damaging if they were short-term, but 
there is an institutionalization process by which temporary sacrifices of civil liberties 
become cemented into national policy. In the initial stages of a crisis there is a general 
willingness to defer to those who possess greater information. This has generally meant 
that the Executive Branch has claimed informational hegemony, and the other branches 
have been reluctant to question its determinations even when they have had serious 
doubts. 24 Once this occurs a public position will have been taken with regard to the 
policy in question, and the different stakeholders will be reluctant to reverse their 
positions. 25
This does not mean that Congress is never willing to contradict itself on earlier 
policy proclamations, but it does mean that there is an institutional inertia which must be 
overcome. Congress has not always proven capable of exercising such will, and this 
represents one of the dangers of an argument that it is not allowed to infringe on the 
24 See Jackson Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (“[the war power] usually is 
invoked in haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. 
It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is 
interpreted by judges under the influence of the same passions and pressures.”); Brennan supra note 1 at 2 
(“The inexperience of decisionmakers in dealing with wartime security claims makes them reluctant to 
question the factual bases underlying asserted security threats.”). 
Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff argue that judges have gradually adopted an institutional process 
approach centered on bilateral cooperation which allows them to resist this temptation. See Richard H. 
Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional 
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 Liberty, Equality, Security (2004) 1. However, this view is 
disputed by a number of scholars who argue that courts routinely defer to the Executive Branch in the post-
Vietnam era. See Devins supra note 9, at 1153 (“as long as the ‘country still seems emotionally engaged in 
this war’… there is little reason to think that the Court will depart from its normal practice of deferring to 
executive branch claims of military necessity”); Louis Fisher, Litigating the War Power with Campbell v. 
Clinton, Presidential Studies Quarterly (Fall 2000), LEXIS (arguing in the post-Vietnam era the judiciary 
has been largely deferential to the President on military matters); Koh, supra note 1 at 72 (“Particularly 
since the Vietnam War, the federal courts, through both action and inaction, have adopted an increasingly 
deferential attitude toward presidential conduct in foreign affairs”). 
25 See Lerner and Tetlock, supra note 18, at 257 (“after people have irrevocably committed themselves to a 
decision, learning of the need to justify their actions will motivate cognitive effort–but this effort will be 
directed toward self-justification rather than self-criticism”).
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President’s Commander in Chief Power. 26 Even if there is no judicial determination on 
the accuracy of the Bush Administration’s position, it would still have serious 
ramifications with regard to branch relations. The creation of it as a viable position would 
have the effect of chilling Congressional action.  Not only would it raise the level of 
consensus and energy necessary to assume its designed role as a check on the President, 
but it would provide an altogether too easy justification for Congressional inaction. 
It is also true that Congress is not immune from making mistakes in its foreign 
policy determinations. There is a critique of Congressional involvement in foreign policy 
decision-making that challenges the institutional competency of Congress. Scholars 
embracing this view generally argue that Congress acts too slowly, is prone to lapses in 
secrecy, and is overly susceptible to changes in public opinion. 27 Notwithstanding the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of this position, there is still reason to believe that Congress 
should have some sort of role in the process. Congress is a broad- based representative 
body and as such it has the power to unite the nation in a way that action by the President 
alone cannot. Arguably from a political philosophy perspective, Congress is the only 
body that has the jurisdiction to commit the nation to morally troubling action, especially 
if it involved strong domestic repercussions. But perhaps the most compelling response to 
this critique of Congress, particularly given the history of the United States in times of 
crisis, is the one provided by John Hart Ely. Quoting from Alexander Bickel he notes, 
26 See Devins, supra note 9, at 1149 (arguing that Congress is a poor check on the Executive because of its 
reluctance to act). 
27 See e.g. Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of 
"Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism?, at: http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/warpowers.htm (2003); John Norton Moore, Do We Have an Imperial 
Congress?, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 139 (1988).
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“Singly, either the President or Congress can fall into bad errors…So they can together 
too, but that is somewhat less likely, and in any event, together they are all we’ve got.”28
III. The Breadth of the Commander in Chief Power
Part of what makes the Bush Administration’s position regarding the 
independence of the Commander in Chief so problematic is their vision of what the 
Clause permits. They argue that it conveys authority onto the President beyond the 
theater of military operations, and enables him or her to act within the domestic sphere. 
They are not attempting to limit the scope of this position, and assert that President Bush 
is empowered to undertake any type of action which he believes is reasonably related to 
success in the war on terrorism. 29 The danger of giving the President such widespread 
authority is that it allows the President intrude deeply into internal issues, much more so 
than his or her normal domestic powers would allow, with an accompanying danger to 
civil liberties.30
Most of the recent jurisprudence on the war powers is centered on whether the 
President has the authority to engage in unilateral war-making, and arguments about what 
powers the President has in the persecution of a war have come up infrequently. 31 For 
28 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS 
AFTERMATH  9 (1993) (quoting Hearings on War Powers, Libya, and State-Sponsored Terrorism Before the 
Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986) (statement of J. Brian Atwood, Director, National Democratic Institute) 
(quoting Alexander Bickel)).
29 See Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law 
and National Security (February 24, 2004) (arguing that the President believes he is authorized to use 
whatever steps required to defeat terrorism); Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms 
While Defending Against Terrorism, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong., Nov. 28, 2001 
LEXIS (statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States) (“The President, as 
Commander-in-Chief, is empowered to take whatever steps he deems necessary to destroy this adversary 
and to defend the Nation from further attack.”)
30 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (arguing 
that domestic exercises of the war power are inherently more suspect). 
31 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 103 (2d ed. 2002) (noting 
that conduct of war questions have come up infrequently in disputes between the branches). 
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this reason the key cases that the administration has cited in support of its policies, Ex 
Parte Quirin32 and the Prize Cases33, are from World War I and the Civil War 
respectively. The President’s arguments thus breathe new life into them as meaningful 
precedents for strong presidential powers. In the case of Quirin, this even involves 
reinterpreting its meaning. In that decision the Supreme Court specifically declined to 
decide whether the President had the inherent Constitutional power to convene military 
tribunals absent Congressional authorization.34 Still, the administration points to Quirin
as standing for the proposition that the President may detain enemy non-combatants 
absent any action by Congress. 35
If it is true that Congress cannot infringe on the Commander in Chief Power by 
statute, then it is doubtful that it would be able to do so through its spending power. 
While Congress’s ability to countermand an Executive decision to commit troops abroad 
is fairly well-founded, the same is not true in the context of conduct of war decisions.36
When troops are sent abroad there are clear funds that must be allocated, but the same is 
not true of how a war is conducted. The tenuous connection between the purposes that 
32 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
33 67 U.S. 635 (1863). 
34
 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (“It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the 
President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the 
support of Congressional legislation.”)
35 See Gonzales, supra note 27 (“The Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Ex parte Quirin acknowledged that 
the President’s war powers include the authority to capture and detain enemy combatants at least for the 
duration of a conflict”); Padilla v. Rumsfeld 352 F.3d 695, 709 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2003) (“The government 
argues that Quirin established the President's inherent authority to detain Padilla”).
36 On the subject of Congress’s ability to end the commitment of troops abroad through the power of the 
purse see generally Colonel Richard D. Rosen, Funding ‘Non-Traditional’ Military Operations: The 
Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1998); Peter Raven-Hansen and 
William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 Va. L. Rev. 833 (1994); Louis 
Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 A.J.I.L. 758 (1989). 
Furthermore, John Hart Ely argues that Congress has never attempted to use its spending power to control 
the Presidential conduct of an authorized war. See Ely, supra note 26, at 25. 
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Congress hopes to achieve and the appropriations on which it would base its authority 
makes it somewhat doubtful that the spending power imbues Congress with extra power 
in this context. Some scholars have argued on this point that the appropriations is an all 
or nothing grant; Congress can decide what to fund but it cannot use funding as an excuse 
to dictate how things bought with those funds are utilized. 37 There is also a strong 
argument to be made, based on Lovett v. United States38, that Congress may not achieve 
through appropriations that which it cannot do through its normal powers.39 Essentially, if 
Congress cannot constitutionally overturn the President’s decision to detain enemy 
combatants by statute then it should not be able to do so through appropriations. 40
IV. Formalism and the Mechanics of Congressional Exclusion
The Executive Branch has not fully fleshed out its argument for why Congress 
should be excluded from interfering with the alleged power of the President to detain 
enemy non-combatants. This is probably due to the fact that Congress has not directly 
challenged any of the decisions made by the President, but it also reflects the fact that 
they view the argument as relatively simple. And from a strict formalist perspective it is a 
straightforward claim. Formalism in the Separation of Powers context is based on the 
premise that the Constitution sought to clearly divide all governmental powers between 
the three branches. The task for courts in Separation of Power disputes is thus one of 
37 Symposium, The Appropriations Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 86 Wash Univ. L.Q. 623, 
628-629 (1990) (William Barr)(arguing that Congress cannot use appropriations as a guise to control 
Executive decision-making).
38
 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
39 See WILLIAMS C. BANKS AND PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF 
THE PURSE 144 (1986) (explaining that Lovett is the basis for the argument that the appropriations power is 
not plenary). 
40 See Barr, supra note 35, at 628-629 ("[The] appropriations power cannot be used to circumvent or 
intrude on the President's inherent authority.").
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categorization, to decide where the power was meant to be allocated. 41 The Bush 
administration believes that the power to detain enemy non-combatants is part of the 
Commander in Chief Power, and thus by definition it cannot be infringed upon by 
Congress. Under formalism this ends the inquiry, and there is no need to balance the 
competing constitutional interests of other branches given that, “where a power has been 
committed to a particular Branch of the Government in the text of the Constitution, the 
balance already has been struck by the Constitution itself.”42 While the President would 
still need to justify why the power to detain emanates from the Commander in Chief 
Clause, the desirability of the formalist framework for the President’s exclusionary 
position is fairly evident. 
Beyond the general arguments for formalism, which are beyond the scope of this 
paper, there are some specific reasons for applying such an approach in this context. 
There is one judicial precedent which states that Congress cannot infringe on the 
President’s Commander in Chief Power, Chief Justice Chase dissenting opinion in the 
1866 case of Ex Part Milligan. 43 However, he only devotes a couple of sentences to the 
matter, and provides little analysis in support of the conclusion. 44 More powerful is the 
41 See Matthew James Tanelian, Note, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine, Two 
Visions, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 961, 1005 (1995) (explaining Separation of Powers formalism as a 
doctrine).
42 Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Justice Kennedy concurring).
43 Wormuth and Firmage argue that this is the only judicial opinion which contains dictum concerning 
whether Congress can restrict the Commander in Chief. SEE FRANCIS D. WORMUTH AND EDWIN B. 
FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 112 (1986).
However, Robert Turner points to a 1897 decision of the US Court of Claims on this point. See ROBERT F. 
TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 27 (1983). 
However, this opinion suffers from the same defects as that of Chase, and does not 
44
 The relevant section of the Chase opinion says that:
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, 
therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all 
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes 
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historical evidence which demonstrates that the Framers conceived of the Commander In 
Chief Clause as a unique grant of authority to the President, outside of the reach of 
Congressional action. This historical evidence is also so widely accepted that arguably
“there is a broad scholarly consensus that Congress may not interfere with the President’s 
day-to-day command of an authorized war, or defense against sudden attack.”45
There was very little debate in the Constitutional Convention on the war powers 
clauses and this makes it difficult to fully unpack the Framers’ intent. 46 It is still possible 
to reach conclusions regarding the allocation of war powers, but scholarship in this area 
has had to interpret from the structure of the clauses. For this reason, the Articles of 
Confederation, as the antecedent to the Constitution, provide an important historical foil 
for understanding the later distribution of war powers. Drafted in 1777 and ratified in 
1781, the United States was governed by the Articles of Confederation until 1788. The 
Articles vested all national powers in the Continental Congress, including all those 
related to warfare. However, the Articles also show a clear demarcation of the war 
powers in that of the clause granting authority to decide issues relating to peace and war 
was separated from the appointment of a commander-in-chief to direct the Army or 
Navy. 47 Additionally, under the structure of the Articles nine states would have to agree 
with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the 
President as commander-in-chief. 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(Chase dissenting)
45
 Banks and Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 150. See also WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF 
MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 212 (1925) (In carrying on of war as Commander-in-Chief, it is he who is 
to determine the movements of the army and of the navy. Congress could not take away from him that 
discretion…nor could they themselves, as the people of Athens attempted to, carry on campaigns by votes 
in the market-place.); Ely, supra note 26, at 25 (“it was the point of the Commander in Chief Clause to 
keep Congress out of day-to-day combat decisions once it had authorized the war in question.”); Turner
supra note , at 26-31 (arguing that Congress cannot usurp Presidential war powers by statute). 
46
 See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 108 (noting the absence of debate on the war powers). 
47 See Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1685, 1704 (2002) (“the Articles…saw the commander-in-chief power as concerning the 
chain of command, not the use of the army to initiate war.”).
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to declare war, and separately nine states would have to agree to the appointment of a 
commander-in-chief. The requirement for separate supermajorities is demonstrative that 
the decision whether to engage in warfare was deemed to be different from the decision 
of how to supervise the conduct of the war. 48
While this difference between conduct and declaration of war existed in the 
Articles of Confederation, there was no indication that the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces would be independent in his or her own sphere. In practice, the Continental 
Congress saw itself as superior to George Washington in deciding how the Revolutionary 
War was to be fought, and meddled with his command. 49 There was great dissatisfaction 
with this arrangement and in drafting the Constitution the delegates sought to grant the 
President more direct power to carry out a war. 50 Evidence for this intent can be found in 
two places within the document. An early draft of the Constitution gave Congress the 
Power “make war”, and one of the primary reasons for the change to “declare war” was 
to make it clear that Congress was not to interfere with combat decisions. 51 On this point 
Robert Turner notes:
The decisions associated with actually conducting hostilities are vested by the 
Constitution in the Commander in Chief – and, indeed, the draft constitution was 
specifically amended on August 17, 1787, to make this separation of powers more 
clear. Should Congress, therefore – to give an extreme hypothetical – seek to 
direct the President to attack a certain hill on a specified date with a specified 
48 See Id. 
49 See Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings 
Restrictions, 60 Minn L Rev 1, 8 (1975) (discussing the Continental Congress’s relationship with General 
Washington). 
50 See Henkin, supra note 29, at 45 (noting widespread dissatisfaction with “War by Congress” as carried 
out under the Articles of Confederation)
51 See Ely, supra note 26, at 5 (“This change was made…to make clear that once hostilities were 
congressionally authorized, the president, as ‘commander in chief’, would assume tactical control (without 
constant congressional interference) of the way they were conducted.”)
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military unit, such an effort would unquestionably be an unconstitutional 
infringement upon the powers of the President as Commander in Chief. 52
However, this change does not necessarily mean that the Framers intended to 
significantly increase the War Powers of the Executive Branch with this change. The 
decision to change the language was made partially in response to a proposal by Pierce 
Butler to vest the entire war power in the President and thus represents something of a 
compromise. 53 While the linguistic change clearly signaled a desire to solely vest the 
President with tactical decision-making power, it is not clear that it was meant to 
accomplish anything more. 54
The other indication of this desire to entrust the responsibility for directing the 
military to the President has to do with the precursors to the Commander in Chief Clause. 
Dissatisfied with the inability of the Continental Congress to effectively govern, many of 
the Constitutional delegates were greatly enamored with the constitutions of New York, 
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.55 Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 69 also 
compares the powers of the President as Commander in Chief to the governor in the later 
two states. 56 Consequently, there is a reason to believe that the war powers of the 
President were modeled upon these state constitutions, and the wording of these 
documents can provide insight into how the Commander in Chief Clause was meant to be 
read. 57 These state Constitutions infused their governor with expansive war powers, 
52 Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair: Was Congress the Real Lawbreaker?, 11 
Houston J. Int'l L. 83, 118 (1988).
53 See Ides, supra note 3 at 78 (discussing the decision to change the language of the War Clause).
54 See Id. 
55 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 167, 253-254 (1996). 
56 See Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 69: The Real Character of the Executive, available at: 
http://federalistpapers.com/federalist69.html. 
57 See Yoo, supra note 53, at 254 (“Reading the proposed Constitution in the context of the state 
constitutions would have come naturally to an eighteenth-century American, because, at the time, the state 
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particularly in how a war could be carried out. Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
granted the governor as Commander in Chief the authority to fully control the military, 
and to use it to, “ ‘kill, slay, and destroy’ by any appropriate means anyone who 
attempted or planned to attack or even ‘annoy’[the state]”. 58 Furthermore, provisions 
found in the other state constitutions which would have severely limited the power of the 
Commander in Chief to direct a war, such as the formation of a joint council with control 
over the military, were expressly not included.59 Taken together, the historical evidence 
provides support for the argument that the judiciary should exercise special scrutiny when 
evaluating possible Congressional infringements on the Commander in Chief Power. 
Given that Congress was never meant to intrude open the Commander in Chief’s 
discretion to conduct a war, the key question becomes whether the decision to detain 
enemy non-combatants is a proper exercise of the Commander in Chief Power. 
Consistent with its presumption that all powers are allocated by the Constitution, 
formalism looks to the text of the Constitution itself to determine how to categorize 
exercise of a power.60 In most instances the text itself is sufficient for the inquiry. For 
example, the Bicameral Requirement at issue in INS v. Chadha 61 is clear on its face, no 
textual or historical analysis is necessary to understand the meaning of the “explicit 
constitutional requirement that all legislation be presented to the President for his 
texts constituted the only other documents that bore a similar level of legal significance to the 
Constitution.”)   
58 Id. 
59 See Id. (“Provisions found in the state constitutions that were not included in the Constitution also 
demonstrate the Framers' intent to create a strong executive in the war powers arena… The Constitution did 
not establish a council with joint control over the military, nor did it require the President to seek legislative 
permission before engaging the military.”)
60 See Michael L. Yoder, Separation of Powers: No Longer Simply Hanging in the Balance, 79 Geo. L.J. 
173, 185 (1990) (explaining that the text of the Constitution is usually determinative). 
61 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
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signature before becoming law.”62 Similarly, in Public Citizen v. United States 
Department of Justice63 it was apparent that the statute interfered with the President’s 
Appointments Power, because the Appointments Clause establishes the “powers of the 
Executive and Legislative Branches with admirable clarity”.64 This type of clarity is 
missing with the Commander in Chief Clause,  as there is an inherent ambiguity to what 
the term connotes and how it interacts with war powers assigned to Congress. 65
When the text of the Constitution is not explicit, formalism does look to history 
and usage to determine how powers were meant to be allocated. 66 In Loving v. United 
States67 the petitioner argued that only Congress could make rules for the application of 
the death penalty in military courts based on Clause 14 of Article I, § 8, which grants 
Congress the power to promulgate rules for “the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval forces”.68 Clause 14 would seem to be an explicit grant of authority to the 
Legislative Branch, but in a majority opinion Justice Kennedy noted that it was necessary 
to do an exhaustive examination of English constitutional history in order to determine 
whether the power was intended to be exclusive. 69 He concluded that, “the history does 
not require us to read Clause 14 as granting to Congress an exclusive, non-delegable 
power to determine military punishments.”70 Article 14 is certainly more clearly defined 
62 Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Justice Kennedy). 
63 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989)
64
 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 487. 
65 See Banks and Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 146 (arguing that national security powers are not 
sufficiently explicit for formalist analysis); Stephen L. Carter, War Making Under the Constitution and the 
First Use of Nuclear Weapons, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHO 
DECIDES? 115 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987) (there is widespread scholarly dispute as to what the 
Commander in Chief Clause means). 
66 See Yoder, supra note 58, at 177 (“Formalism also stresses the importance of history and practice when 
the Court labels a power as executive, legislative, or judicial.”)   
67 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
68 Loving, 517 U.S. 761
69 See Id. 
70 Id.
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than the Commander in Chief Clause, as it includes verbs within it which give meaning to 
the type of actions that can be justified as part of the power. Loving thus suggests that in 
order to determine the meaning of the Commander in Chief Clause it is necessary to look 
to what the Framers intended to convey through the power. 
While the Framers intended that the Commander in Chief Clause would convey a 
power to the President that would be independent on Congress, most of the evidence 
suggests they felt this power would be very limited. Indeed, given the system of checks 
and balances found throughout the Constitution it would seem incongruous that in one of 
the most important areas of governance they would want to instill the President with 
authority as broad as that argued for by the Bush Administration. The available historical 
evidence backs up this contention, as it demonstrates that the Framers intended that the 
Commander in Chief Clause would convey nothing more than that the President would 
have independent authority in battlefield decisions. This is not to say that the detention of 
enemy non-combatants cannot be justified under the President’s Commander in Chief 
Power, on which this paper does not take a position. Rather, the point is that formalism is 
based on an originalist position regarding the division of constitutional authority that is 
inflexible in application, and the original understanding of the Commander in Chief 
Clause is simply not consistent with the Administration’s argument for Congressional 
exclusion.71
One of the strongest indications that the Framers had a narrow vision of what the 
Commander in Chief Clause was supposed to mean is the possible war time authority 
which they declined to entrust to the President. While the failures of the Continental
71
 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 487 (suggesting that the Supreme Court could not tolerate even minor 
“tinkering” with how the Framer’s divided power). 
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Congress to manage the revolutionary war might have been the impetus for the Framers 
to give the Commander in Chief independent authority to conduct a war, it is significant
that they did not address the major failing of the Continental Congress. Despite the fact 
that George Washington’s inability to independently raise supplies had proven costly 
during the Revolutionary War, the Framers still did not feel comfortable with giving the 
President such authority. 72 Furthermore, the broad language of the war clauses from the 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions, which were the model for the 
Commander in Chief Clause, was also not included in the Constitution. These clauses 
gave the chief executive of their respective states wide discretion to choose when and 
how a war was to be conducted. Instead, they choose a title which at the time of the 
Constitution’s drafting was a generic term denoting the highest officer in a particular 
chain of command. 73 In all probability, the Framers probably sought to do little more 
than confirm that the President would be the final authority on battlefield decisions, as 
Louis Henkin notes: “there is little evidence that, by [the Commander in Chief Clause], 
the Framers intended more than to establish in the Presidency civilian command of the 
armed forces.” 74
There was little debate during the Continental Convention on the Commander in 
Chief Clause, which in of itself suggests something about the Clause. The delegates 
expressed great trepidation in general about powers conferred to the President, and the 
fact that so little discussion was generated by the Clause is indicative that they felt it 
bestowed little power. Wormuth and Firmage note on this point that, “even the most 
72 See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 107 (explaining the significance of the Framers not giving 
the President the authority to raise supplies). 
73 See Id.; Ely, supra note 26, at 142.  
74
 Henkin, supra note 29, at 45. 
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apprehensive members of the Convention did not fear the legal powers conferred by the 
commander in chief clause.”75 In one of the few contemporary writings on the Clause, 
Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers that it “would amount to nothing more than 
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces…”.76 While 
Hamilton’s writing cannot be considered dispositive on the extent of the power, the 
Supreme Court relied on it in one of its few pronouncements on the Commander in Chief 
Power:
As commander-in-chief, [the president] is authorized to direct the movements of 
the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them 
in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the 
enemy. 77
If the Framers intended for the Commander in Chief Clause to only convey authority to 
direct the Army and Navy on the battlefield then the logical conclusion would be that 
Presidential decisions external to that limited sphere would not be deserving of the same 
degree of exclusivity. Or at the very least, it seems clear that there is a disconnect 
between an expansive view of the Commander in Chief Clause and the argument from 
formalism that Congress cannot infringe on the Power. 
The second problem with applying the formalist position is that there is 
overlapping and tangled authority between the branches in the war powers in a different 
way then other parts of the Constitution. 78 It is not just the clause itself is ambiguous, but 
the text does not sufficiently reveal how the Framers intended it to interact with 
Congress’ war powers. This problem is compounded by the lack of definitive historical 
75 See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 107 109. 
76
 Hamilton, supra note 54. 
77
 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850). See Ely, supra note 26, at 142 (arguing that the language of 
Fleming v. Page was based on Hamilton’s writings). 
78 See Carter, supra note 62 at 111 (arguing that one must use greater interpretation with war powers 
because the lines of authority are not clear). 
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information on how the Framers intended the war power clauses to interrelate. Stephen 
Carter goes so far as to argue that, “despite the devoted efforts of legions of scholars to 
unpack the history of these clauses, I fear…the legislative history of the war mar making 
power teaches us almost nothing concrete about the Framers’ understanding.”79
Consequently, the clear demarcation of powers ideal that lies at the heart of the formalist 
understanding is difficult to sustain in the context of war powers. 
In light of the overlap of the war powers, even some of the Court’s strongest 
supporters staunchest supporters of a formalist position have tended towards a balancing 
approach in war power cases. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan Justice 
Rehnquist employed the more functionalist approach of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer80 in analyzing the Separation of Powers issues,
though he was careful to qualify that the method was not proper for all such cases. 81
Even more telling may be the separate opinions of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas 
in Loving. That case involved a grant of war power to the Congress, the Regulation
Clause, which is much more explicit in being an exclusive grant of power than the 
Commander in Chief Clause. However, all three justices saw some degree of concurrent 
authority for the Executive Branch by virtue of the Commander in Chief Power. Loving is 
thus demonstrative that in practice the Supreme Court has difficulty in employing a 
straight formalist approach to the war powers. 
In his Majority opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that one of the reasons that 
Congress could delegate authority to make regulations for the military death penalty was 
that the Executive has some concurrent authority on the basis of the Commander in Chief 
79
 Id., at 112. 
80 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
81
 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 939. 
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Power. 82 Even more revealing was his statement that by virtue of the Regulation Clause, 
“Congress… exercises a power of precedence over, not exclusion of, Executive 
authority.” 83 This is something of a strange conclusion given that the history detailed by 
Kennedy uses the strongest possible language in articulating that the Regulations Power 
was given exclusively to Congress and was not meant to be subject to limitation.84 He 
does not completely clarify the reason for this conclusion, but the language implies this is 
due to the Executive’s concurrent authority. It would seem that Kennedy is rejecting 
some of the central tenets of formalism by finding that the text and the history of Clause 
14 are not conclusive in a Separation of Powers evaluation. 
The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas also acknowledge the 
existence of some blurring between the Congressional and Presidential war powers. 
While he is referring to an instance of cooperation between the branches, as opposed to 
conflict, Scalia does note that:
[Article 14] does not set forth any special limitation on Congress's assigning to the 
President the task of implementing the laws enacted pursuant to that power. And it 
would be extraordinary simply to infer such a special limitation upon tasks given to 
the President as Commander in Chief, where his inherent powers are clearly 
extensive. 85
This language is far from a conclusion that a balancing test should be utilized in war 
powers disputes between the branches, but it is an acknowledgement that the President’s 
82 See Loving, 517 U.S. 768 (“it would be contrary to the respect owed the President as Commander in 
Chief to hold that he may not be given wide discretion and authority.”) 
83
 Loving, 517 U.S. 768. 
84 Kennedy stresses that Clause 14 was intended to be a grant of exclusive power to Congress. For 
example, he notes from the writings of Alexander Hamilton that Clause 14 was given to Congress: 
“without limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national 
exigencies, or the corresponding extent & variety of the means which may  be necessary to satisfy 
them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.” 
Loving, 517 U.S. 765. 
85
 Loving, 517 U.S. 771 (Justice Scalia concurring). 
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war powers may overlie those of Congress. If not for some concurrent authority then 
there would be no reason to afford special respect to an assignment of authority by 
Congress in this area. Thomas is even more candid in conceding that the Commander in 
Chief Power gives the President shared authority in this area. 86 Thomas explains that 
there is a history of according Congressional decisions on military discipline great 
respect, as well as the traditional deference given to the Commander in Chief. The 
convergence of these two lines of thought means that Separation of Power decisions are 
unique in this area: 
I write separately to explain that by concurring in the judgment in this case, I take 
no position with respect to Congress' power to delegate authority or otherwise 
alter the traditional separation of powers outside the military context. 87
While Thomas confines this statement to military matters, the same would seem to be 
true of Presidential decisions lying at the edge of the Commander in Chief Power. This 
point will become more apparent in the next part of the paper, which demonstrates the 
degree to which Congress’ war powers give it concurrent authority in how a war is 
conducted. 
V. Balancing: Congress versus the Commander in Chief Power
Opposed to formalism is a functionalist perspective, which holds a different view 
of the clarity of Constitutional allocations of power. Functionalism is predicated on the 
idea that it is not always clear how the Framers intended powers to be allocated between 
the branches, and indeed, this is of secondary importance. According to functionalism 
what matters most is strengthening the overall aim of the Framers, namely a proper 
86
 Loving, 517 U.S. 778 (Justice Thomas concurring) (“heightened deference extends not only to 
congressional action but also to executive action by the President, who by virtue of his constitutional role 
as Commander in Chief…possesses shared authority over military discipline.)
87
 Loving, 517 U.S. 778 (Justice Thomas concurring). 
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functioning system of checks and balances. 88 In the war powers context, functionalism is 
most fully articulated in Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown. 89 Jackson 
emphasized the importance of how the disparate wa r powers were designed to interact as 
a structure. In rejecting an approach that would simply try to categorize powers as 
belonging to a particular branch he noted that, “the actual art of governing under our 
Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.” 90 In terms 
of war powers, the division of authority between the branches suggested to him that the 
Framers were trying to create a model of balanced institutional participation in war 
decisions. It is this idea which underlies his tripartite method for analyzing Presidential 
power, as it stresses that the President’s power is at its highest when he or she cooperates 
with Congress.91 It was also on this basis that he rejected Truman’s argument for 
inherent, and thus exclusive, authority to seize the steel mills. He felt that it would 
subvert the Framer’s intent to so completely unfetter the President in the conduct of war. 
92
While Jackson ruled against the President in Youngstown, there is a difference 
between the method he employed and his arguments that were specific to the facts of the 
case. Jackson’s opinion is best known for the tripartite structure he outlines, but what is 
88 See Tanelian, supra note 39, at 966-967 (explaining Separation of Powers functionalism as a doctrine). 
89 See Koh, supra note 1, at 78 (noting the lasting the influence of Youngstown). 
Given how widely understood Jackson’s concurrence is I will not digress into an explication of the 
tripartite structure. 
90 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 635. 
91 See Koh, supra note 1, at 73 (arguing that an ideal of balanced participation underlies Jackson’s 
concurrence).  
92 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 644 (“But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me 
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, 
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his 
own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.”). 
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sometimes overlooked is that it is a framework that is supposed to be used for analyzing 
Presidential power, and not for analyzing the Separation of Powers. Consequently, in a 
zone three situation, where the President’s power is at its lowest, his or her power is only 
low compared to where it could be if he or she were cooperating with Congress. It does 
not necessarily mean that the President’s power is low relative to Congress. When 
Congress and the President are in conflict a decision still needs to be made which branch 
possesses the power. Roy Brownell delineates how Jackson suggested such a 
determination should be made:
a third category action taken by the President would involve a constitutional 
calculus just as it would for first and second category actions. The powers of 
Congress would be subtracted from those of the President. If the President were 
"in the red" so to speak, the action would be struck down, but if the President had 
sufficient inherent power to overcome those of Congress, his action would be 
upheld. 93
Essentially, Jackson was advocating a balancing test to decide where the power lies, 
though the test would be broad in scope, looking to the overall Constitutional structure to 
see which branch had more inherent authority. The consequence of finding that the 
President had more inherent authority would be significant, because, “courts can sustain 
exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting 
upon the subject.” 94 Consequently, it would still be possible for a President to argue for 
exclusive control under the logic of Jackson’s opinion. It is not even necessarily more 
difficult compared formalism, it just appears that way because the tripartite structure 
favors cooperation between the branches. However, in certain instances cooperation is 
93 Roy E. Brownell, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. 
Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J. L. & Politics 1, 53 (2000).
94 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 638.
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not going to be possible, or perhaps even desirable, and at that point a calculus will need 
to be made of which branch has more claim to authority based on inherent powers. 
Why the President Should Win a Balancing Test
While Jackson interpreted the structure of the Constitution as favoring Congress 
in a zone three situation, there is reason to believe that most courts would conduct such a 
balancing test in a way that would be favorable to the Executive Branch. There is a line 
of cases separate from the Youngstown strain that is sympathetic to claims of broad 
Executive authority. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp95, the Supreme Court 
held that great deference should be given to Presidential determinations in the context of 
foreign policy, given the Executive Branches inherent policy-making advantages. 96 For 
example, while the power to make treaties is divided equally between the President and 
the Senate, Justice Sutherland argued for a sharply limited Congressional role:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative 
of the nation.  He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.” 97
Curtiss-Wright, and its progeny, have come to stand for the proposition that broad 
deference should accorded Presidential determinations in foreign policy, even when they 
come into conflict with Congress. 98
95 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
96 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 309.
97 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
98 See Brownell, supra note at 41 (arguing that Curtiss-Wright has been used by the Executive Branch to 
exclude Congress from policy-making decisions); Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or 
Unconstitutional Veto, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHO DECIDES? 
149 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987) (“Curtiss-Wright was a decision of towering importance…its 
expansive view of presidential power…provided the constitutional justification for presidential exercise of 
vast power”).
29
One of the pillars of the decision is that foreign affairs are different from domestic 
affairs, and the special challenges of the external sphere are better suited to the strengths 
of the Executive branch.99 Beyond the accuracy of this line of reasoning, which many 
scholars find dubious, the case does not seem to support Presidential claims to domestic 
power. 100 This point was made by the Majority in Padilla, which contended that Curtiss-
Wright was not implicated because at issue was the power to detain an American citizen 
seized inside the United States. 101 This is something of an over-simplification of Curtiss-
Wright’s meaning, as there is a strong international component involved, but it certainly 
limits how compelling the case is as a precedent. Furthermore, as Justice Jackson 
emphasized in Youngstown, the use of the war powers to justify action in the domestic 
sphere is particularly suspect. 102 As the earlier words of Madison indicated, the Framers 
were well aware that times of war presented an opportunity for the Executive Branch to 
seize power. 103 The internal/external dichotomy is the equivalent of a logical Rubicon, a 
clear marker that will signal when there is a danger that the President has over-stepped 
the bounds of his or her mandate to lead the nation. 
In addition to the general respect to be afforded the President in foreign affairs, 
there is another argument for Presidential authority beyond his or her inherent powers. 
The President may be able to lay claim to special power on the basis of an emergency, or 
authorization by Congress which would trigger his or her general Executive Power. The 
Prize Cases demonstrate that in times of a national crisis the President can accomplish 
99 See Brownell, supra note at 28-29 (noting the internal/external dichotomy of Curtiss-Wright). 
100 See Id., (noting the heavy criticism that Sutherland’s arguments about Presidential superiority in foreign 
affairs has received); Koh, supra note 1 at 94-95 (explaining the many problems with Curtiss-Wright). 
101 See Padilla 352 F.3d 714.
102 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 660 (Justice Jackson concurring) (“No penance would ever expiate the sin 
against free government of holding that a President can escape control of executive powers by law through 
assuming his military role.”). 
103 See infra note 20. 
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things that would not be normally possible under the Constitution.104 Arguably, the Prize 
Cases represent a very special exception, but there is an inescapable logic to the fact that 
compelling circumstances might justify Executive claims to strong powers.105 One of the 
advantages of the Executive Branch that Sutherland emphasized in Curtiss-Wright is the 
speed with which the President can act, and it seems reasonable that in the immediate 
aftermath of a crisis this characteristic might need to be called upon. However, this power 
would seemingly decrease in direct proportion to the amount of time that has elapsed 
since the crisis. Furthermore, this advantage of swift decision-making would be negated 
by Congressional action, so it is not clear on what basis the Prize Cases would empower 
the President in a branch conflict. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the decision stressed that 
one of the bases of its decision was that Congress later ratified the action. The different 
concurring opinions in the Prize Cases actually, “offer affirmative support for the view 
that the President’s commander in chief power can by limited by the Congress in the 
exercise of its own powers. They lend no support at all to the opposite proposition.”106
The opposite of the emergency power situation is when Congress has acted to 
ratify Presidential action. Under the Youngstown tripartite structure the President’s power 
would be at its zenith, and in a branch conflict later attempts to control this power may be 
frowned upon. Congressional flip-flopping on important issues plays into the critique of 
104 See e.g. Padilla 352 F.3d 728 (Justice Wesley dissenting) (“As I read The Prize Cases, it is clear that 
common sense and the Constitution allow the Commander in Chief to protect the nation when met with 
belligerency and to determine what degree of responsive force is necessary.”)
105
 Wormuth and Firmage argue that the Prize Cases were decided upon by a slim 5-4 majority, and the 
decision was carefully circumscribed in what it would permit. They also point out that at the most the Prize 
Cases justify is a triggering of a state of war, which would do no more than allow the President to exercise 
his or her normal Commander in Chief Powers. See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 68-70. Their 
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Congress as an institutionally flawed actor, and undercuts arguments for their inclusion. 
Just how much weight Congressional ratification should given is difficult to quantify. 
However, in a structural sense something very similar happens when Congress declares 
war, triggering the full force of the Commander in Chief Power, and later attempts to 
change the parameters of the conflict. This will be explored in greater detail in the next 
section, as well as arguments for why Congress’ war powers empower it to regulate the 
conduct of a war. 107
Why Congress Should Win a Balancing Test
What must be weighed against the powers of the President are Congress’ own 
War Powers, and the structural considerations which underlie them. The case for 
Congress winning a balancing test is predicated on two of the three Congressional War 
Powers: the War Clause and the Army Clause.108 While it is somewhat a simplification of 
the war powers structure, it is evident that without an army to command or a war to fight
the Commander in Chief Power would have no meaning. In a sense, the existence of the 
President’s war power is contingent on exercises of Congressional power. This situation 
is reflected in the fact that the War Clause and the Army Clause empower Congress to set 
substantive limits on the parameters of the Commander in Chief Power. If Congress 
limits the scope of a war to a particular theater, or only allocates a certain amount of 
manpower, then the President must work within these limits. These powers extend so far 
as to allow Congress to change the boundaries of the President’s mandate to direct a war 
after it has commenced. Consequently, while it was not contemplated that Congress 
would make tactical decisions, the Framers imparted onto Congress substantial authority 
107 See infra pp. 31-31 (explaining the meaning of the naval war cases). 
108
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to direct the conduct of a war. To the extent that Congress is superior to the Commander 
in Chief in making these determinations, there is strong support for the proposition that in 
a branch conflict it has a stronger Constitutional interest in seeing its will asserted, and 
should prevail over the President. 
The War Clause grants Congress the power to declare war, grant letters of 
marquee and reprisals, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. What is 
important for the question at hand is the fact that in a series of early cases the Supreme 
Court decided that this included the authority to declare limited wars, and that Congress 
could determine the scope of those limits. 109 These cases were decided in a period from 
1800 to 1804, and their historical proximity to the writing of the Constitution gives them 
special importance. The Supreme Court has recognized that contemporaneous legislative 
determinations of the meaning of the Constitution are to be accorded a marked degree of 
interpretive weight. 110 Here there are not only not only legislative acts which 
demonstrate that Congress can define the limits to a war, but judicial decisions as well.  
These cases involved a naval war with France in which Congress placed both use 
and area restriction on the exercise of military power. The original legislation provided 
that only public ships could engage French ships found to be ‘hovering’ off the U.S. 
coast. Later, the use restrictions were broadened to include armed U.S. merchantmen, and 
the area restrictions were changed to allow the engagement of all French ships. 111 The 
fact that these limits changed over time is important, because the cases, “suggest that 
109 See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 58-60 (noting that the possibility of limited war was 
decided by Bas v. Tingy (1800), Talbot v. Seeman (1801), and Little v. Barreme (1804)). 
110
 Id. at 61 (arguing that special weight should be given to the three decisions). 
111 See Banks and Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 155 (discussing the legislation involved in the naval 
war); Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 58. 
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Congress may change the limits and therefore the scope of [a war] while it is being 
fought”. 112
In the last of these cases related to the naval war, Little v. Barreme, the 
President’s orders conflicted with the dictates of Congress, but Congress’ will was still 
considered determinative. Chief Justice Marshall explained that the fact the Presidential 
directive violated a statute meant that it was null and could not insulate the captain of the 
naval vessel from liability. 113 Marshall pointed out that the captain had to be held liable 
no matter how pressing the circumstances that might have justified his belief that he 
should seize the vessel in question. He thus recognized that even in the rapidly changing 
circumstances of naval engagement the will of Congress with respect to how the war was 
to be fought had to take precedence. 114 This is strong support for the proposition that the 
War Clause allows Congress to define significant aspects of how the Commander in 
Chief can conduct a war. 
The Constitution was written prior to the existence of a standing army, and 
consequently it was only when the Congress called forces into existence that the 
President could exercise his Commander in Chief Power. 115 The Framers also clearly 
envisioned the power to fund the military as continuing to give Congress the authority to 
rein in Executive war-making even after such a force had been called into existence. 116
What is less evident is what authority does the power to raise and supply the army give 
112 Banks and Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 155; See also Henkin, supra note 29, at 103-104 (arguing 
that Congress can limit the scope of a war in the middle of the conflict). 
113 See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 60 (“Since the President’s instructions collided with the act 
of Congress, they were illegal and could neither justify the seizure nor excuse Captain Little from 
damages.”). 
114 See Id. (relating the meaning of Marshall’s opinion). 
115 See Carter, supra note 62, at 113 (“few would quarrel with the conclusion that the armed forces which 
the President commands are the ones that Congress raises and supports”). 
116 See infra note 31 (explaining the importance of appropriations in the military context). 
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Congress to control the combat decisions of the Commander in Chief. Congress plays 
some role by virtue of the fact that it makes the decisions concerning what type of army 
to fund. 117 This necessarily impacts some of the parameters of the President’s authority, 
as it dictates what number and type of forces can be deployed. On this point Stephen 
Carter relates:
Unless there is a Platonic essence called “army”…then the most sensible 
understanding of the constitutional language is surely that the Congress can raise 
the army it wants, no other army exists for the President to command. If the 
Congress says the army shall consist of no more than one million soldiers, I see 
no way that the President can recruit one million and two. If the Congress says the 
army shall have no more than two thousand tanks, the President possesses no 
authority to purchase three thousand instead. 118
Just because there is currently a standing army should not decrease the authority that the 
Clause was meant to express. The modern army is a convenience that allows the nation to 
act with speed in responding to a threat, thus facilitating deterrence. It may delegate this 
authority to the President, but the only way to give the Clause substantive meaning is to 
assume that with each new conflict the Congress gets to decide the composition of the 
force. For example, this means that Congress could decide that nuclear weapons are not 
to be part of the arsenal allocated to a particular conflict, which would have the effect of 
only allowing the President to use conventional weapons. 119
Similar to the decision to not allocate to the President nuclear weapons for a 
conflict, Congress could seemingly not fund troops for a particular theater of operation. 
Congress has the power to decide whether or not to raise an army for a particular war, so 
117 See Banks and Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 152-153 (noting that all military appropriations are 
based in the power to raise and support armies). 
118 Carter, supra note 62 at 113. 
119 See Peter Raven-Hansen, Nuclear War Powers, 83 A.J.I.L. 786, 789 (1989) (arguing that 
the President cannot escalate a conventional war to a nuclear war absent Congressional 
authorization). 
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there is no reason why it could not dictate that the army was brought into being only to 
fight in one country but not another. Carter uses the example of an army that was 
restricted from fighting against Canada to explain why the distinction between 
size/component decisions and area restrictions is arbitrary:
Nothing in the language of the Constitution suggests a distinction between rules 
limiting the number of tanks and limiting the theater of operations…the rule 
prohibiting war making against Canada is also a restriction on what the armed 
forces shall be: they shall not be the sort of armed forces that fight a war with 
Canada, just as they shall not be the sort of armed forces that…purchase tanks 
more than three thousand. 120
While Carter’s point is well taken that the decision to raise a particular army involves 
more than simple numbers of arms and manpower, it is easy to understand how this could 
overwhelm any sense of an independent Commander in Chief. Given the existence of a 
standing army and the fact that most wars are not officially declared by Congress, 
Congress may have tacitly agreed to the existence of a certain “type” of army for 
purposes of a conflict. Allowing Congress to later decide that this army was not created 
to participate in a particular theater of combat would seem to intrude open the President’s 
core Commander in Chief Power. After a war has been authorized, the practical dictates 
of combat mean that the Commander in Chief must be given some leeway to determine 
what the proper field of combat is and how to make best use of the available manpower. 
So just how far the Army Clause allows Congress to control an army in a declared war is 
unclear; but given the lack of a standing army in the Framer’s time, it is apparent that the 
Clause was meant to convey a great deal of influence to Congress. Consequently, in most 
120
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situations where there would be a conflict between the branches the Army Clause should 
tip a balancing test in favor of Congress.  
Beyond the two Clauses there is additional evidence for why Congress 
should prevail in a balancing test. Historical practice demonstrates that Congress has 
repeatedly infringed upon the Commander in Chief Power, including its core meaning of 
tactical decision-making. For example, on a number of occasions Congress has directly
mandated or limited the movement of troops. In 1794 Congress authorized the stationing 
of up to 2,500 militiamen in Pennsylvania. 121 In 1836 Congress appropriated money for 
the removal of Fort Gibson from Indian Territory to a location near the border of 
Arkansas. 122 In 1940 Congress provided that no military selectee could be stationed 
outside of the Western hemisphere. 123 Wormuth and Firmage contend this practice has 
been historically widespread, and that, “it is not for want of constitutional power that 
Congress has not controlled the movement of troops more directly; it is because the 
problems of military management do not lend themselves to legislative decision.” 124
Wormuth and Firmage also point to the large number of instances in which 
Congress has limited Presidential access to the military. For example, in 1947 Congress 
enacted the National Security Act, which established the chief of staff system. This had 
the effect of making it impossible for the President to convey an order except through the 
medium of a designated subordinate, the secretary of defense. If the subordinate was 
recalcitrant, there would be no way for the President to issue orders to the lower echelons
121 See Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 41, at 113. 
122 See Id. 
123See Id., at 113-114. 
124 See Id, at 114. 
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of the military hierarchy.125 Similarly, in 1908 acted to limit the circumstances in which 
the President could request assistance from the National Guard, and entrusted state 
governors with the task of calling out the Guard. 126 These statutes set up structures that 
limited the President to command the military, and as such are arguably invasive 
infringements on the Commander in Chief Power. Presidential acquiescence to them thus 
supports the conclusion that it is within the power of Congress to limit the authority of 
the Commander in Chief. 
VI. Conclusion 
While some of the subsidiary arguments within this paper could be extended 
further; in reality, the paper stands for a very limited proposition: it would be imprudent 
and contrary to the Constitutional structure to argue that Congress does not have the 
power to over-ride Presidential decisions justified by an expansive view of the 
Commander in Chief Power. In most time periods this would also be considered to be a 
fairly uncontroversial position. For example, in a 1990 academic work Vice President 
Cheney was sharply critical of what he considered to be Congressional overreaching in 
foreign policy; however, he was also explicit in relating that Congress has a role to play 
in the formulation of a successful foreign policy. He explained each branches role in 
relation to what he considered to be their strengths:
Congress was intended to be a collective, deliberative body. When working at its 
best, it would slow down decisions, improve their substantive content, subject 
them to compromises, and help build a consensus behind general rules before they 
were to be applied to the citizenry. The presidency, in contrast, was designed as a 
one-person office to ensure that it would be ready for action. Its major 
125 See Id., at 92-93. 
126 See Id., at 93. 
38
characteristics, in the language of Federalist No. 70, were to be ‘decision, 
activity, secrecy and dispatch”. 127
Everything that Cheney said is consistent with this paper’s conclusions, as certainly the 
speed and decisiveness of the Executive Branch are considerable advantages in 
responding to a crisis. However, deliberation and consensus-building are also valuable 
characteristics, and given this nation’s history of overreacting to crisis situations there is 
good reason to believe they may be of primary importance. As the third anniversary of 9-
11 approaches, which the Executive Branch argues is the trigger for its expanded 
authority, it also seems unrealistic to continue to be stressing speed over deliberation. At 
the very least it seems important to hold open the possibility of Congressional action. 
Arguments for excluding Congress create the possibility that the Executive Branch will 
be wholly unaccountable, with the accompanying traditional dangers associated with 
fully insulated decision-making. There may be a value to having uncertainty and a certain 
degree of flux in the demarcation of war powers that risks being lost by aggressive steps 
by one branch to carve out an area of exclusive authority. The fact that such a position 
has never been advanced by a President in our Constitutional history should make the 
Executive Branch, and the Supreme Court for that matter, pause; and consider that 
perhaps engagement with Congress would be more fruitful than attempts to exclude it as 
an actor.    
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